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T h e  m a jo rity  o f  th e . o ld e r A s ian  p o p u la tio n , ap p ro x im a te ly  th re e -  
q u a r te rs , re s id e  w ith  th e i r  a d u l t  c h ild re n  (M a rtin  1989).' H ow ever, 
re c e n t re s e a rc h  su g g es ts  t h a t  su ch  co residence  m a y  b e  d ec lin in g  in  
som e c o u n trie s  su ch  a s  J a p a n  (M a rtin  a n d  C u lte r  1983, H iro s im a  
1987) a n d  S o u th  K o rea  (K im  a n d  C hoe 1992) a n d  T a iw a n  (M a rtin  
1991). In  m a n y  n o n -W e ste m  co u n trie s , su ch  a s  M alay s ia  a n d  
S in g ap o re , th e re  is  co n sid e rab le  d e b a te  o v e r how  m u ch  g o v e rn m e n t
v e rsu s  fam ily  su p p o rt sh o u ld  b e  .p rov ided  fo r th e  ca re  o f th e  o ld e r)
p o p u la tio n . In  c o n tra s t  to  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s , w hose  g o v e rn m en t
£
prov ides s u b s ta n tia l  t r a n s fe rs  to  th e  e ld e rly  th ro u g h  Social S e c u rity  
a n d  M ed icare , som e n o n -W este rn  c o u n trie s  a re  try in g  to  re in fo rce  
fam ily  su p p o rt n e tw o rk s . |
M alay s ia , th e  co u n try  co n sid ered  h e re , p ro v id es  som e econom ic 
in cen tiv es , in  th e  fo rm  o f ta x  in cen tiv es , fo r a d u lt  ch ild ren  to  h e lp  
su p p o rt a n d  to  live  w ith  th e i r  p a re n ts . S ince  1979, a d u lt  c h ild re n  w ho 
live w ith  th e i r  p a re n ts  h a v e  received  a  ta x  re b a te  o f  M $1,000 
(ap p ro x im a te ly  U S  $400). In  1991, ta x  a m m e n d m e n ts  w ere  in tro d u ce d  
su ch  th a t  a d u l t  ch ild ren  can  c la im  a  M $1,000 ta x  d ed u c tio n  fo r m ed ical 
expenses in c u rre d  for th e i r  p a re n ts  a n d  a  M $3,000 d ed u ctio n  fo r th e  
p u rc h a se  o f a n y  n e ce ssa ry  b a s ic  su p p o rtin g  e q u ip m e n t fo r d isab led  
p a re n ts  (M a lay s ian  In la n d  R ev en u e  T ax  D e p a r tm e n t 1993). In  
ad d itio n , a p p lic a n ts  fo r low -cost h o u s in g  a re  g iv en  h ig h e r  p r io r ity  i f  
th e i r  p a re n ts  coreside  w ith  th e m . T h ese  econom ic in cen tiv es  m ir ro r  
som e po licies o f  M a la y s ia ’s n e ig h b o r, S in g ap o re , su ch  as  q u ic k e r 
a llocation  o f a d u l t  ch ild ren  w ho coreside  w ith  one  o r m ore  e ld e r ly
p a re n ts  (S tra i ts  T im es: M a y  1 6 th , 1987), S in g ap o re  a lso  p ro v id es  
econom ic in c en tiv e s  in  th e  fo rm  o f b ig g e r m o rtg ag e  lo an s, sm a lle r  dow n 
p a y m e n ts , a n d  e a s ie r  r e p a y m e n t schem es. T h e  M a la y s ian  g o v e rn m e n t 
a lso  p ro v id es  p e rso n a l w e lfa re  a ss is ta n c e  to  ag ed  p a re n ts  i f  th e i r  a d u lt  
c h ild re n  h a v e  in su ffic ie n t m e a n s  to  su p p o rt th e m . F o r th o se  e ld e rly  
w hose c h ild re n  a re  d e ad  o r u n a v a ilab le , a  re h a b ili ta tio n  schem e ex ists  
w h ereb y  th e  v illage  o r co m m u n ity  receives a  g ra n t  from  th e
g o v e rn m en t to  ta k e  ca re  o f th e  ag ed  a n d  th e  p o o re s t o f th e  poor. T h u s ,?
g o v e rn m e n t polic ies in  M a la y s ia  t r y  to  en co u rag e  fam ily  su p p o rt for
£
th e  e lderly ; th e  g o v e rn m e n t m a in ly  s tep s  in  w h e n  fam ily  su p p o rt is  
n o t feasib le .
In  o rd e r  to  u n d e rs ta n d  à n d  p re d ic t ch an g es  in  coresidence 
p a t te rn s  in  n o n -W e ste m  c o u n trie s , a n d  th e  possib le  effects o f policies 
p ro m o tin g  ex ten d ed  liv in g  a rra n g e m e n ts , w e n e ed  to  k now  m o re  a b o u t 
th e  fac to rs  in flu en c in g  coresidence. T h ese  fac to rs  in c lu d e  n e ed s  a n d  
p re fe ren ces  o f  o ld e r peop le  a n d  o f th e i r  a d u l t  ch ild ren , a n d  th e  costs 
a n d  b e n e fits  t h a t  th e y  each  a sso c ia te  w ith  coresidence.
In  th is  p a p e r  w e u se  d a ta  from  th e  S econd M a la y s ian  F a m ily  
Life S u rv ey  (M FLS-2) to  an a ly ze  th e  liv in g  a r ra n g e m e n ts  o f th e  o ld er 
p o p u la tio n  in  P e n in s u la r  M alay s ia . W e in v e s t ig a te  th e  fac to rs  t h a t  
in flu en ce  th e  p ro p e n s ity  o f “sen io rs” (p e rso n s ag ed  60 o r o lder) to 
coreside w ith  a n  a d u lt  child . T h e  fac to rs  co n sid ered  h e re  in c lu d e  
h o u s in g  costs, incom e, a n d  ru ra l-u rb a n  location ; c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f th e  
sen io rs  (an d  th e i r  spouse , i f  m a rr ie d ) , su ch  a s  th e i r  g en d er, h e a lth ,  age, 
m a r i ta l  s ta tu s ,  ed u ca tio n , a n d  e th n ic ity ; a n d  th e  n u m b e r, ages, a n d
g e n d e r o f  t h e i r  a d u lt  ch ild ren . T h is  a n a ly s is  ex ten d s  p rev io u s  re se a rc h  
on  liv in g  a r ra n g e m e n ts  in  develop ing  co u n trie s , w h ich  h a s  n o t 
in v e s tig a te d  th e  effects on  liv in g  a r ra n g e m e n ts  o f h o u s in g  costs , 
c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f spouses, th e  re so u rce s  o f  th e  e ld erly , a n d  th e  ag es  o f 
a ll o f th e i r  ch ild ren , a n d  w h e th e r  effects o f  th e  e x p lan a to ry  v a ria b le s  
d iffer b e tw ee n  th e  m a rr ie d  a n d  u n m a rr ie d . A t th e  en d  of th e  p a p e r  w e 
sp ecu la te  a b o u t th e  p o te n tia l effects o f po lic ies desig n ed  to  enco u rag e  
p a re n t-c h ild  co residence  a n d  a b o u t how  coresidence  is  lik e ly  to  be  
affected  b y  socioeconom ic developm en t.
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Conceptual Framework, Previous Research, And Hypotheses
W e h y p o th esize  t h a t  cojresidence o f o ld e r people w ith  th e i r  a d u lt  
ch ild ren  is  a ffec ted  by  th e  costs  a n d  b e n e fits  o f  coresidence, th e  
o p p o rtu n itie s  fo r coresidence, a n d  th e  p re fe re n ce s  o f sen io rs  a n d  th e ir  
ch ild ren . A  s im ila r  f ram ew o rk  h a s  b e e n  u se d  in  m a n y  s tu d ie s  o f liv in g  
a rra n g e m e n ts  (e.g., B u r r  a n d  M u tc h le r  1992; C as te rlin e , W illiam s, 
H e rm a lin  e t  a l. 1991; G o ldsche ider a n d  D aV anzo  1989; W olf 1984; W olf 
a n d  Soldo 1988), a lth o u g h  th e  c a teg o riza tio n  o f fac to rs  a n d  th e  
te rm in o lo g y  u sed  to desc rib e  th e m  d iffers so m ew h a t across s tu d ie s . In  
th is  sec tion  w e d iscuss som e o f th e  w ays in  w h ich  th e  c h a ra c te r is tic s  of 
sen io rs  (a n d  th e i r  spouses) a n d  th e i r  c h ild re n  m a y  re la te  to  th e s e  costs, 
b en efits , o p p o rtu n itie s , a n d  p re fe re n ce s  a n d , hen ce , how  th e se  
c h a ra c te r is tic s  m a y  m o tiv a te  o r d isco u rag e  coresidence. W h ere  
re le v a n t, w e rev iew  p rev io u s  re se a rc h  on  th e s e  is su e s . W e recognize  
th a t  th e  b en e fits , costs, a n d  p re fe ren ces  a sso c ia te d  w ith  p a re n t-c h ild
coresidence  m a y  d iffer b e tw ee n  th e  p a r e n ts  a n d  th e  ch ild ren  
(G o ldscheider a n d  G o ldsche ider 1992) a n d  p e rh a p s  a lso  b e tw ee n  th e  
tw o p a re n ts  o r  am o n g  th e  ch ild ren . P re su m a b ly  conflicts a re  reso lv ed  
th ro u g h  in te rp a r ty  b a rg a in in g ; w e observe  on ly  th e  n e t  outcom e o f 
su ch  b a rg a in in g .
Benefits of Coresidence
T h e  b e n e fits  o f co residence ra n g e  from  com pan ionsh ip  a n d  
em otiona l su p p o r t to  th e  fu lf illm en t o f th e  p h y s ica l a n d  f in an c ia l n eed s  
o f p a re n ts  a n d  ch ild ren . C oresidence  p ro v id es  com p an io n sh ip  a n d  
social su p p o rt fo r b o th  p a re n ts  a n d  ch ild ren . I t  is  freq u e n tly  co n tended
th a t  n o tio n s  o f  “in d iv id u a lism ” a re  n o t a s  p re v a le n t in  n o n -W e ste m
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societies a s  th e y  a re  in  th e  W es t a n d , th u s , t h a t  co m p an io n sh ip  is  s till 
a  h ig h ly  v a lu e d  com m odity . W e expec t t h a t  o ld e r people w ho a re  n o t 
c u rre n tly  m a rr ie d  sh o u ld  be m o re  lik e ly  to  coreside  w ith  a n  a d u l t  ch ild  
b ecau se  th e y  la c k  th e  com p an io n sh ip  a n d  em o tio n a l, fin an c ia l, a n d  
p h y sica l su p p o rt o f a  spouse.
F ro m  b o th  th e  p a re n ts ' a n d  th e  c h ild re n 's  pe rsp ec tiv e , 
co residence m a y  su p p ly  fin an c ia l su p p o rt o r  dom estic  serv ices. I f  th e y  
coreside w ith  th e i r  p a re n ts , ch ild ren  m a y  be ab le  to  p rov ide goods a n d  
serv ices t h a t  th e i r  p a re n ts  m ig h t o th e rw ise  h av e  to  p u rc h a se . T h is  
m a y  b e  esp ec ia lly  im p o r ta n t fo r sen io rs  w ho  a re  in  poor h e a lth , w ho 
a re  o lder, o r w ho a re  poor. In d e e d , g r e a te r  p h y s ica l d isab ilitie s  h av e  
b e e n  found  to  b e  a sso c ia ted  w ith  in c re a se d  co residence  in  th e  U n ite d  
S ta te s  (e.g., W olf 1984, W olf a n d  Soldo 1988). A lso, u n m a rr ie d  sen io rs
m ay  h a v e  a  g re a te r  n e e d  fo r a ss is ta n c e  from  ch ild ren :- U n m a rr ie d  
m a le  sen io rs  m a y  esp ec ia lly  n e e d  h e lp  w ith  d o m estic  ho p seh o ld  
ac tiv itie s , w h e re a s  u n m a rr ie d  fem ale  sen io rs  m a y  n eed  f in a n c ia l 
a ss is tan c e . A d u lt ch ild ren , a lso , m a y  b e n e f it fro m  coresidence. T h e ir  
p a re n ts  m a y  be  ab le  to  p ro v id e  h e lp  w ith  ch ild  c a re  o r w ith  o th e r  
ho u seh o ld  serv ices. T h is  m a y  b e  espec ia lly  im p o r ta n t  a s  m o re  y o ung  
w om en w o rk  o u ts id e  th e i r  hom es. F u r th e rm o re , i f  th e  p a re n ts  a n d
ch ild ren  w o rk  to g e th e r  in  a  fam ily  e n te rp r is e  (e.g., on a  fa rm  o r in  a
)
n o n -a g ric u ltu ra l fam ily  b u s in ess), coresidence  m a y  red u ce  th e
£
t ra n sa c tio n s  costs o f w o rk in g  to g e th e r.
C oresidence  a lso  econom izes on th e  cost o f liv ing . P a re n ts  a n d  
ch ild ren  can  sav e  m oney  b y  liy in g  a n d  e a tin g  to g e th e r. T h is  is  
especially  re le v a n t  w h e n  h o u s in g  costs a re  h ig h  o r in c re as in g , a s  is  th e  
case in  m a n y  develop ing  co u n trie s . T h u s , “econom ies o f sca le ,” a s  w ell 
as  th e  ab ility  to  consum e h o u seh o ld  “p ub lic  goods,” p rov ide  a n  a d d ed  
in cen tiv e  to w a rd s  co residence (L am  1983). P rev io u s  re se a rc h  h a s  
show n co residence  in  u rb a n  a re a s  to  be  m o re  p re v a le n t th a n  in  ru r a l  
a re a s  in  a  n u m b e r  o f A sian  co u n trie s  (A ndrew s, E s te rm a n , B ra u n ac k - 
M ayer, a n d  R u n g ie  1986; C a s te r lin e  e t  a l. 1991; K im  a n d  C hoe 1992). 
T h ese  d ifferences m ay  be d u e  to  th e  g re a te r  h o u s in g  costs in  u rb a n  
a re a s . A n d rew s e t  al. n o te d  th is  p o ssib ility , co m m en tin g  th a t  
coresidence m a y  be m ore  a  m a t te r  o f n e ce ss ity  th a n  tra d itio n ; h o u s in g  
sh o rta g es  in  u rb a n  a re a s  m a y  m o tiv a te  coresidence, w h e rea s , in  r u r a l  
a re a s , o u t-m ig ra tio n  o f c h ild re n  m ay  le s s e n  th e  o p p o rtu n itie s  for 
coresidence. C h en  (1987) n o te s  t h a t  la n d  a v a ila b ility  in  r u r a l  a re a s
m a k e s  i t  e a s ie r  for th e  e ld e r ly  to  m a in ta in  s e p a ra te  househo lds; 
ch ild ren  m a y  live  close b y  a n d  th u s  p a re n ts  c an  g e t  help» easily . T h ese  
h y p o th ese s  m a y  w ell describe  th e  M a la y s ia n  s itu a tio n . B elow  w e 
in v e s tig a te  w h e th e r  a re a  h o u s in g  costs a ffec t coresidence a n d  w h e th e r  
th is  m ay  c o n trib u te  to  th e  u rb a n - ru ra l  d iffe ren tia ls  observed  in  
p rev ious s tu d ie s .
T he follow ing h y p o th ese s , d e r iv e d  from  th e  above d iscussion , a re  
te s te d  in  th is  p ap e r . U n le ss  o th e rw ise  n o ted , each  h y p o th esis  
d escribes th e  effect o f a  v a r ia b le  w h en  a ll o th e r  v a ria b le s  in  th e  m odel 
a re  contro lled .
(1) U n m a rr ie d  sen io rs  a re  m ore  lik e ly  th a n  c u rre n tly  m a rr ie d  sen io rs  to
coreside w ith  th e i r  a d u lt  ch ild ren .
(2) T he  h ig h e r  th e  h o u s in g  costs in  a n  a re a , th e  m ore  lik e ly  a  se n io r  is  to
coreside w ith  a n  a d u lt  child .
(3) C oresidence  m a y  be h ig h e r  in  u rb a n  a re a s  a s  a  re s u l t  o f h ig h e r
h o u s in g  costs. H ence , w e expec t u rb a n - ru ra l  d ifferences to  
s h r in k  once h o u s in g  costs a re  con tro lled .
(4) S en io rs  in  p o o re r h e a l th  sh o u ld  be m o re  lik e ly  to  coreside w ith  a n
a d u lt  child .
(5) O lder age, w h ich  m ay  be c o rre la ted  w ith  p o o re r h e a lth , m a y  be
positiv e ly  a sso c ia ted  w ith  coresidence. S u ch  age effects sh o u ld  
w eak en  once h e a l th  is  con tro lled .
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Costs
C oresidence  m a y  a lso  h a v e  costs, fo r e i th e r  p a re n ts  o r c h ild re n  
o r b o th . C oresidence  e n ta i ls  a  lo ss  o f p rivacy . H ig h e r  incom e en ab le s  
people to  “p u rc h a se  p riv acy ” a n d  in d ep en d en ce  a n d  a lso  to  p u rc h a se  
serv ices (e.g., h ousew ork , cooking) t h a t  co resid in g  ch ild ren  m a y  
provide. In d e e d  m a n y  s tu d ie s  o f  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  h av e  fo u n d  a  
positive  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  econom ic re so u rce s  a n d  in d e p e n d e n t
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liv in g  (e.g., B eresfo rd  a n d  R iv lin  1966; M ichael, F u ch s , a n d  S co tt 1980; 
M u tch le r a n d  B u r r  1991; Pampfel 1983). P a re n ts  w ho a re  ab le  to  affo rd  
s e p a ra te  re s id en c e s  can  choose w h en  to  see  th e i r  ch ild ren  (“in tim a c y  a t  
a  d is ta n ce ”); th is  m ay  be  p re fe ra b le  to  co resid in g  w ith  th e ir  c h ild re n  
a n d  b e in g  w ith  th e m  a ll o f th e  tim e . M a r tin  (1990) a rg u e s  t h a t  contro l 
o f econom ic re so u rce s  is  c ritic a l to  th e  e ld e rly ’s w ell-being . H ence , 
a n o th e r  cost o f coresidence m a y  be a  decline  in  s ta tu s  o f th e  e ld e rly  i f  
th e i r  con tro l over econom ic re so u rce s  is  ta k e n  over b y  th e i r  a d u lt  
ch ild ren . G iven  th e se  possib le  costs o f co residence  a n d  th e  g re a te r  
choices t h a t  h ig h e r  incom e p rov ides, w e ex p ec t t h a t  h ig h er-incom e 
p a re n ts  sh o u ld  be le ss  lik e ly  to  coreside w ith  th e i r  a d u lt  ch ild ren , 
p re su m in g  t h a t  p riv acy  a n d  in d ep en d en ce  a re  v a lu ed  b y  M a la y s ia n  
elderly . T h u s  w e hypo thesize :
(6) S en io rs  w ith  h ig h e r  incom es sh o u ld  b e  le ss  lik e ly  to  coreside.
Opportunities - ' -
“O p p o rtu n itie s” m a y  a lso  a ffec t d ecis ions to  coreside. I n  th is  
con tex t, th e  n u m b e r  o f  ch ild ren , ages o f ch ild ren , a n d  g en d e r 
com position o f c h ild re n  av a ilab le  m ay  p la y  im p o r ta n t  ro les. A  p a re n t  
w ith  a  g re a te r  n u m b e r  o f ch ild ren  h a s  a n  in c re a se d  n u m b e r o f choices 
o f ch ild ren  w ith  w hom  to  coreside. In d eed , a  n u m b e r  o f s tu d ie s  o f A sia  
a n d  th e  P acific  (e.g., A nd rew s e t  al. 1986, C a s te r lin e  e t  al. 1991,S
K ojim a 1987, a n d  M a r tin  1989), a s  w ell a s  o f developed  co u n trie s  (e.g., 
E a s te r lin , M acdonald , M acunovich , a n d  C rim m in s  1992) a n d  h is to ric a l 
p o p u la tio n s  (A lter, C lig g e tt, a n d  U rb ie l, fo rthcom ing) h av e  fo u n d  th a t  
th e  n u m b e r o f c h ild re n  a v a ilab le  for a  sen io r to  live  w ith  is  positiv e ly  
re la te d  to  th e  sen io r 's  like lihood  o f co resid in g  w ith  a n  a d u lt  child . 
(T here  is  a  p o ssib ility  o f re v e rse  c a u sa tio n  h e re . P a re n ts  w ho d es ired  
to live  w ith  a  ch ild  w h e n  th e y  w ere  o ld er m a y  h av e  chosen  to  h a v e  
m ore  b ir th s  fo r th is  re a so n .)
A ges o f c h ild re n  m a y  a lso  a ffect coresidence. Y ounger a d u lt  
ch ild ren , e.g ., in  th e i r  e a r ly  tw e n tie s , m a y  be m ore  lik e ly  to  be 
co resid ing  in  th e i r  p a re n ts ’ hom e b ecau se  th e y  a re  s till in  school, 
u n m a rr ie d , o r  f in an c ia lly  u n a b le  to s e t  u p  in d e p e n d e n t ho u seh o ld s . In  
develop ing  c o u n trie s , ch ild ren  ty p ica lly  re m a in  in  th e i r  p a re n ts ' hom es 
u n til  th e y  m a rry , a n d  som etim es a f te rw a rd s  a s  w ell (D om ingo a n d  
C a s te r lin e  1992). H ow ever, a s  c h ild re n  becom e o ld e r a n d  m o re  
e s tab lish ed , th e y  m a y  h a v e  m ore  to  offer to  th e i r  a g in g  p a re n ts ,  a n d  
th e  p a re n ts  m a y  be m o re  lik e ly  to  coreside  w ith  th e m  for th is  re a so n .
T h u s, th e  ag e  o f c h ild re n  is  a  p o te n tia lly  im p o r ta n t  v a ria b le
in flu en c in g  th e  d irec tio n  o f re so u rce  flow s b e tw ee n  p a re p ts  a n d
ch ild ren  a n d  hen ce  th e i r  decisions to  coreside . H ence , som e sen io rs
m ay  b e  co resid in g  w ith  y o u n g e r a d u l t  c h ild re n  n o t fo r re a so n s  o f old
age  su p p o rt, b u t  r a th e r  b ecau se  th e y  a re  s til l  liv in g  w ith  th e m  a s  p a r t
o f th e  n o rm a l course  o f th e  life cycle (D om ingo a n d  C a s te r lin e  1992;
R nodel, C hayovan , a n d  S iriboon.1992). O th e r  sen io rs  m ay , by
c o n tra s t, be  choosing  to  live  w ith  o ld er a d u lt  c h ild re n  to  re a p  som e of
?
th e  b en e fits  d iscu ssed  above. M a r tin  (1989) fo u n d  a  g e n e ra l d ec rease  
in  co residence a sso c ia ted  w ith  a n  in c re a se  in  th e  sen io r 's  age  a n d  
co n jec tu red  th a t  i t  m a y  b e  d u e  to  a  confound ing  effect of age of 
ch ild ren , w h ich  sh e  could  n o t pb serv e  in  h e r  d a ta . C a s te r lin e  e t  a l. 
(1991) do co n sid e r ag es  o f c h ild re n  a n d  fin d  th a t ,  w h en  age o f y o u n g est 
ch ild  is  con tro lled , th e  effect o f sen io r 's  age  on  th e  like lihood  o f liv in g  
w ith  a  ch ild  lo ses  s ta t is t ic a l  sign ificance; sen io r 's  age h a d  a  
s ig n ifican tly  n eg a tiv e  effect on co residence  in  t h a t  s tu d y  w h en  ch ild 's  
age w as n o t con tro lled .
T he  g e n d e r  com position  o f a d u lt  c h ild re n  w ith  w hich  to  
p o te n tia lly  coreside m a y  a lso  in flu en ce  decisions to  coreside. In  m a n y  
A sian  socie ties, i t  is  o ften  p re fe ra b le  to  co reside  w ith  sons d u e  to  
c u ltu ra l n o rm s. G en d er com position  o f c h ild re n  m a y  also  a ffect 
coresidence b ecau se  d a u g h te rs  m a r ry  a t  a  y o u n g e r age  th a n  son s  a n d  
hen ce  ty p ica lly  le av e  hom e sooner. In  M a la y s ia  th e  av erag e  d ifference  
b e tw een  m a le s ’ a n d  fe m a le s ’ age  a t  m a rr ia g e  is  4-5 y e a rs  (T an  a n d  
Jo n e s  1990). A lth o u g h  som e c h ild re n  s ta y  in  th e i r  p a re n ts ' o r p a re n ts '-
in  law  ho m es im m e d ia te ly  a f te r  m a rr ia g e , m a n y  s e t  u p  in d e p e n d e n t 
h o u seh o ld s  w ith in  a  y e a r  o r so a f te r  m a rr ia g e  (T an  an d a lo n es  1990).
W e t e s t  th e  follow ing h y p o th e se s  re g a rd in g  c h a ra c te r is tic s  of 
ch ild ren  th a t  m ay  affect o p p o rtu n itie s  to  coreside:
(7) T h e  g re a te r  th e  n u m b e r o f a d u lt  ch ild ren  th e  sen io r h a s , th e
m o re  lik e ly  th e  sen io r  is  to  coreside w ith  a n  a d u lt  child .
(8) S en io rs  w ith  y o u n g e r a d u lt  ch ild ren  a re  lik e ly  to  h av e  th e se
ch ild ren  s till liv in g  w ith  th em . T h u s , o th e r  th in g s  th e  sam e,
?
sen io rs  sh o u ld  be le ss  lik e ly  to  coreside  a s  th e  age o f th e ir
£
ch ild ren  in c rease s , th o u g h  th e re  m a y  be  in c re a se s  in  
co residence a t  o ld e r ch ild  ages. C o n tro llin g  for ag es  o f 
c h ild re n  sho u ld  m a k e  th e  effect o f th e  sen io r 's  ow n ag e  le ss  
n eg a tiv e .
(9) T he  g e n d e r  com position o f ch ild ren  sh o u ld  h a v e  a n  effect on
coresidence. I t  is  h y p o th esized  th a t  o ld e r M a la y s ian s  a re  m ore  
lik e ly  to  live w ith  a d u lt  ch ild ren  i f  th e y  h a v e  sons, b e ca u se  sons 
m a r ry  la te r  th a n  d a u g h te rs . A lso m a n y  M a la y s ian s  m a y  p re fe r  
to  live  w ith  sons r a th e r  th a n  d a u g h te rs  d u e  to  c u ltu ra l n o rm s  a n d  
p rac tices.
Preferences
C u ltu ra l n o rm s a n d  m o d e rn  v a lu e s  m a y  affect a t t i tu d e s  a b o u t 
coresidence. I n  M alay sia , th e  th re e  m a in  e th n ic  g ro u p s -- M alay s , 
C h in ese  a n d  In d ia n s  -- com prise  th re e  d is tin c t c u ltu re s  w ith  d iffe rin g  
a t t i tu d e s  to w a rd s  coresidence. T h e  M alay s , w ho com prise  over one-
h a lf  th e  p o p u la tio n  o f P e n in s u la r  M a lay s ia , a re  M u slim s a n d  do n o t 
h av e  a s  s tro n g  a  p a tr ia rc h a l  fam ily  s tru c tu re  a s  th e  C h inese . T h e  
m a jo rity  o f C h in ese , w ho m a k e  u p  a ro u n d  a  th i r d  o f th e  M a la y s ian  
po p u la tio n , follow  C o nfuc ian  e th ic s , w h ich  s tre s s  filia l p ie ty  to w a rd s  
e ld ers . T h e  In d ia n s , w ho acco u n t fo r a ro u n d  10% o f th e  p o p u la tio n , a re  
m a in ly  T am ils  from  S o u th e rn  In d ia  a n d  a re  m a in ly  H in d u s . T h e  
H in d u  id e a l w ith  re g a rd  to  p a re n t-c h ild  re la tio n s  is  dependence; H in d u
e ld e rly  ex p ec t to  re ly  on  th e i r  sons, especially , to p rov ide  for th e m  in?
old age  (G oldste in , S ch u le r, a n d  R oss 1983). P rev io u s re s e a rc h  on
c
M ala y s ian s  aged  60 a n d  o ld er fo u n d  th a t ,  o f  th e  e th n ic  g ro u p s, M alay s  
a re  th e  le a s t  lik e ly  to  coreside w ith  th e i r  a d u l t  ch ild ren , a n d  C h in ese  
a re  th e  m o s t lik e ly  (M a rtin  1969). T h is  m a y  be  d u e  to  th e  
p re d o m in a n tly  ru r a l  c h a ra c te r  o f th e  M alay  com m unity . M alay  
p a re n ts  a re  lik e ly  to  ow n th e i r  ow n la n d  in  ru r a l  a re a s  a n d  a re  th u s  
capab le  o f m a in ta in in g  h o u seh o ld s  s e p a ra te  from  th e i r  ch ild ren  (C hen  
1987). A lso th e i r  ch ild ren  m a r ry  e a r lie r , on  av e rag e  (T an  a n d  Jo n e s  
1990). C h in ese  a n d  In d ia n  M a la y s ian s  a re  m ore u rb a n ; hence , i t  m ig h t 
be  m ore  expensive  fo r th e m  to  m a in ta in  h o u seh o ld s  s e p a ra te ly  from  
th e ir  a d u lt  ch ild ren . T h is  ru ra l-u rb a n  d ifference  m ay  p a r tly  acco u n t 
for e th n ic  d ifferences in  coresidence  p a tte rn s .
In  a d d itio n  to  i ts  a sso c ia tio n s  w ith  n e ed s  a n d  w ith  ag es  o f 
ch ild ren  d iscu ssed  above, th e  sen io r 's  ag e  a lso  m a y  in fluence  
p re fe ren ces  re g a rd in g  co residence. T h e re  m a y  be  a  cohort effect, w ith  
th e  o ld est peop le  b e in g  th e  m o s t tra d it io n a l  a n d  hence  h a v in g  a  
g re a te s t  p re fe ren ce  fo r coresidence. S im ila r ly  people  liv in g  in  ru r a l
areas may be more traditional, while those living in urban areas may 
be more modern in their attitudes. Higher education, in addition to 
being correlated with greater access to resources, may also be 
correlated with having more modem values. More “modem” seniors 
may prefer privacy and independence over coresidence with children, 
and their greater access to resources may better enable them to 
“purchase” this privacy.
Our hypotheses based on characteristics of seniors that may 
affect preferences to coreside are:
(10) Malay seniors should be less likely than Chinese or Indian
seniors to coreside due both to cultural differences and to the 
facts that Malays are more likely to live in rural areas, where 
housing costs are lower, and that Malay children marry at 
younger ages on average. We expect that, once rural-urban 
location and housing costs are controlled, these ethnic 
differences will lessen somewhat.
(11) Because they may have more traditional attitudes, other things
the same, older seniors should be more likely to coreside.
(12) More educated seniors will be less likely to coreside with adult
children due to their more modem values, as well as greater 
access to resources.
(13) Adjusting for urban-rural differences in housing costs, older
people in rural areas will be more likely to coreside with their 
adult children than those in more urban areas because their 
attitudes are more traditional.
Data And Methods 
Data
This analysis uses data from the Senior sample of the Second 
Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS-2), which was fielded between 
August 1988 and January 1989 iii Peninsular Malaysia. The MFLS-2 
Senior sample, the only nationally representative sample of the older 
population in Peninsular Malaysia, includes 1,357 respondents aged 
50 or older living in private households. In addition to fairly detailed 
data on these “seniors,” some information is available on their spouses 
and on their grown children, both those living with the respondent and 
those living elsewhere. MFLS-2 also fielded a community 
questionnaire (MF26), which provides information about all 
enumeration blocks in the MFLS-2 sample (of which there were 398 
chosen with probability proportional to size). In this analysis we use 
MF26 information about housing costs in each area.
Refusal rates were below 3% of the living quarters that may 
have contained respondents eligible for the Senior sample. Interviews 
could not be completed in a further 3% of the households with 
residents eligible for the Senior sample because of illness or deafness of 
the selected respondent. Thus, the sample for this analysis must be 
considered slightly truncated, with some of the most severely disabled 
older persons in the target population unavailable for interview. (For 
more information about MFLS-2, see Haaga, DaVanzo, Peterson, Tey, 
and Tan [1993].)
Malaysian Indians were double sampled to provide sufficient 
sample sizes for analyses within each ethnic group. If a living quarter 
contained more than one resident eligible for the Senior sample, one 
was selected at random using the Kish selection procedure. The 
descriptive analyses below are weighted to adjust for the oversampling 
of Indians and for the number of-seniors in the household who could 
have been chosen for the Senior sample. The multivariate analyses 
control for ethnicity.
Samples, Estimation, and Variables Considered
£
The sample used for this analysis consists of 660 seniors age 60
or older who had at least one adult child. 1 (Most studies of aging in
iAsia [e.g., Martin 1989; Casterline et al. 1991] consider a sample of 
persons aged 60+.) In this analysis, a child is defined as “adult” if 
he/she was 20 years old or older. A higher cut-off point, say age 25, 
may have been more appropriate in Malaysia, where children tend to 
leave home at later ages than in more developed countries. It was not 
possible, however, to use a cut-off point between 20 and 30 years old 
because, in MFLS-2, ages of Seniors’ children living elsewhere are only 
available in 10-year age categories. (This is because Senior 
respondents had great difficulty reporting the precise ages of their non­
coresident children). The age cut-off of 20 used here gives us a general 
measure of family extension. Coresidence may occur because children 
leave home later, never leave home, return home after leaving, or 
because parents move in with children. In the sample considered here,
most coresiding adult children are not at the youngest end of the age 
distribution. Over one half of the coresiding children are older than 25 
and around one-third of coresiding seniors live with a child aged 30 or 
older. (Other studies of parent-child coresidence in LDCs [e.g., Martin 
1989, Casterline et al. 1991] do not impose anv restrictions on the 
children’s ages that they consider; coresident children could be younger 
than 20 and sometimes are.)
Our dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator that equals
?
one if the senior lives with an adult child (age 20 or older) and zero 
otherwise. In these data, of tlmse with adult children, 69% of married 
seniors and 73% of unmarried seniors aged 60 or older live with an 
adult child. Of those seniors Jvith adult children, only 2% of the 
married and 14% of the unmárried live alone.
Multivariate analyses are estimated using logistic regression. 
For several of the explanatory variables, we also note results obtained 
when other explanatory variables were not controlled, since several of 
our hypotheses deal with the sensitivity of results to whether other 
variables are held constant.
We estimate separate regressions for married seniors (n=371) 
and unmarried seniors (n=289). We stratify by marital status because 
we expect the effects of some of the explanatory variables to differ for 
the married and unmarried. Furthermore, the specifications differ for 
the two groups because spouse characteristics are relevant for the 
married group but not for the unmarried. For the married sample, the 
units of observation are couples, with separate variables referring to
husbands (either male Senior respondents or the spouses of female
Senior respondents) and wives (female Senior respondents or the
spouses of male Senior respondents). The unmarried sample consists
of 64 males and 225 females. (In Malaysia many more men than
women remarry after divorce or being widowed.) We tried interacting
all the explanatory variables with gender for the unmarried sample, to
allow effects to differ for males and females, but none of the ,
interactions were statistically significant. We have also estimated a
?regression that pools the married and unmarried to assess the effect of 
marital status when other variables are controlled. This regression 
(which is briefly discussed, but not presented here) is similar to those 
in other studies of elderly livipg arrangements in LDGs, which 
typically combine married and unmarried respondents and do not 
consider spouse characteristics.
Table 1 presents the weighted means of the variables used in 
our analysis. Below we briefly discuss the independent variables 
considered.
M a rita l Status. A s noted above, regressions have been 
estimated separately for the married and unmarried. The vast 
majority (91%) of the unmarried sample are widowed; 5.2% are 
divorced and 4.2% are separated. Widowed, divorced, and separated 
did not differ significantly in their living arrangements and are not 
distinguished in the analyses .
H o u sin g  Costs. Data from the Community Questionnaire 
(MF26) supply information on the costs of specific types of housing in
each enumeration block (EB) in the sample.^ We use these area
housing costs in our analysis so that our results are not fconfounded by
individuals' housing costs being correlated with the size of their
households (and hence their living arrangements).
Lo ca tio n. We consider three categories of location:
Metropolitan/large urban, small urban, and rural. (The data
distinguish between metropolitan areas [population above 75,000] and
large urban areas [nonmetropolitan areas with population greater than*
10,000], We have combined these into one category because their 
coresidence patterns did not differ significantly from each other. Also, 
the average housing costs were very similar in the two types of areas.) 
Metropolitan/large urban is défined as an area with a population above
10.000, small urban as an area with a population between 1,000 and
10.000, while even smaller areas are rural, which is the reference 
group in the regression analyses. Over one-half of the seniors in each 
of our subsamples live in rural areas.
H e a lth . Seniors were asked to rate their own health and their 
spouses' health as “good,” “fair,” or “poor.” These ratings are entered 
into the regression as indicators of seniors' and spouses’ health, with 
“good” as the reference category. (This three-category ranking 
correlates well with more detailed information available on limitations 
in activities of daily living [ADLs] [Haaga, Peterson, DaVanzo, and Lee 
1990]. We do not use the ADL information here because it is not 
available for spouses of the selected respondents.)
Age. In preliminary studies we considered the age of
respondents (and of their spouses if they were married).* However,
none of the age variables were statistically significant when the other
variables considered here were controlled. For this reason, we exclude
age from regressions presented here.
Incom e. Our income variable is average monthly unearned
income of the senior (and his/her spouse) during the year preceding the
survey, excluding transfers received from either other households or?
public sources. We exclude from our income measure:
£• the income of household members other than the senior
respondent and spouse, because the very existence of such 
income is determined by living arrangements;
• earned income of the senior (and his/her snouse). because it is the
result of decisions concerning working, which may be jointly 
made with decisions about living arrangements; and
• transfer income, because it may be jointly determined with living
arrangements. (For example some older people may receive 
money from non-coresident children rather than living with 
one of their children [see Chan 1991].)
We have also estimated the regressions using broader definitions of 
income that include the components listed above to illustrate how 
estimated income effects differ when these components are included.
The measure of income we use here includes dividends, or 
interest on savings, pensions and EPF (Employees Provident Fund) 
payments, and rents, for the Senior respondent and his/her spouse, if
he or she is married. Lump-sum payments (such as ÈPF distributions) 
were annualized for these calculations assuming ten years of 
remaining life on average. The most important sources of non-familial 
support for the older population in Malaysia are the EPF and pension 
schemes (Haaga, Peterson, DaVanzo, and Lee 1990). The natural 
logarithm of the quantity of unearned income plus M$1 is entered into 
the regression to account for skewness in the income distribution.
Sixty percent of the total sample has no unearned income; of those 
with income, the median is M$300. Five percent of the sample have 
monthly unearned income of M $ 1,440 or higher.
E d u ca tio n . Education is included as a proxy for preferences and 
may also be related to the levçl of permanent income. Education of 
respondents (and spouses) is represented by three categories: none (the 
reference group), primary (six or less years of schooling), and secondary 
(seven or more years of schooling). Husbands, on average, are better 
educated than wives, while unmarried seniors are the least highly 
educated. The lower education of the unmarried sample probably 
largely reflects the older age of this sample. (Forty-nine percent of 
respondents in the unmarried sample are aged 70 or older, compared 
with 33% of husbands and 10% of wives in the married sample.)
N um ber, Ages, and G ender o f C h ild re n . In order to be included 
in the sample, the senior had to have had at least one adult child (aged 
20 or older). The total number of adult children a senior had, whether 
living at home or living elsewhere, is included in the analysis to 
measure the “opportunities” to live with an adult child. (On average,
married seniors in our sample had 5.3 adult children and unmarried
seniors had 4.8.) '
We allow the effect of these children to differ by their age and
gender, by including in the regression the numbers of children the
senior had in each age/gender group. The variables included are
numbers of sons 20-29, 30-39, and 40+, and the numbers of daughters
in each of these age groups. (The children of married seniors,are
younger, on average, than those of unmarried seniors [see Table 1].)ï
We also consider the number of children under age 20, since this may 
affect decisions about whether older children remain in the household.
E th n ic ity . Dummy variables for Chinese and Indians are 
included to assess the influence of ethnicity on coresidence. Malays 
and the category “Other” (of which there are only 5 seniors) are the 
reference group in the regression.
Results
Marital Status
As noted above, in the sample considered here (people aged 60+), 
unmarried seniors are somewhat more likely to coreside with at least 
one adult child than are married seniors (73% compared with 69%). 
This difference is not statistically significant, however, and this 
remains true even when the other variables considered here are 
controlled. Hence, the data do not support Hypothesis #1.
Table 2 presents separate logistic regressions explaining 
coresidence for the married and the unmarried subsamples.3
Housing Costs
Housing costs are positively and significantly (P <.05, one-tailed 
test) associated with coresidence for the married sample but not for 
the unmarried.^ The result for the married is consistent with our 
hypothesis (#2) that parents and children are more likely to live 
together when housing costs ar£ high. Coresidence among unmarried 
seniors may be less affected by housing costs because unmarried 
seniors may have a stronger motivation for coresidence because they




When no other variables are controlled, coresidence rates are 
highest in the most urban areas. Eighty-two percent of married 
seniors in the largest urban areas coreside with an adult child, 
compared with 55% in small urban areas and 63% in rural areas. The 
pattern is similar for the unmarried, for whom the coresidence rates 
are 78%, 57%, and 71% respectively.
Housing costs are higher in more urban areas of Malaysia. (The 
average housing cost is M$96,493 in metropolitan/large urban areas, 
M$52,250 in small urban areas, and M$36,201 in rural areas.) This 
explains some of the tendency toward greater coresidence in more 
urban areas for the married (the group for whom housing costs have a
significant effect). In particular, when housing costs are controlled we
see less of a tendency toward coresidence in large urban* areas,
compared with smaller urban areas or rural areas, than when housing
costs are not controlled. However, for the married, significant
differences among different types of areas remain, even when housing
costs (along with the other variables in Table 2) are controlled. In
particular, there is a tendency towards greater coresidence in rural
areas compared with small urban areas, despite the lower housing
?
costs in rural areas, and in larger urban areas compared with smaller
£urban areas, despite our efforts'“to control for the higher housing costs 
in the larger areas. Both of these differences are statistically 
significant for the married sample. The higher coresidence rate in 
rural areas is consistent with our presumption that rural residents are 
more traditional in their attitudes toward parent-child coresidence.
The higher rates in rural and in the larger urban areas may also 
reflect a greater incidence of family enterprises in such areas (e.g., 
farms in rural areas), which may make intergenerational coresidence 
economically beneficial.
Health
In Hypothesis #4, we expected that seniors in poorer health 
would have a greater need for assistance from their children and hence 
be more likely to coreside with their adult offspring. We see some 
evidence of this for married seniors, but not for the unmarried. 
Husbands in poor health are significantly more likely to coreside than
husbands in fair or good health. Wives in fair health are significantly 
more likely to coreside than those in good health; those in poor health 
are more likely to coreside than those in good health, but the difference 
is not statistically significant. It is interesting that it appears to be 
only very serious health problems for husbands (poor health) that 
increase the likelihood of coresidence, whereas fair health has this 
effect for wives, perhaps because even a moderately unhealthy wife 
cannot perform household tasks efficiently. We also considered 
interactions of the husband’s and the wife's health, since husbands and 
wives may be able to help each other if only one is in poor health but 
they may have a greater need for help from children if both are in 
poorer health. However, we found no significant interaction effects 
between the husband's and wife's health.
Seniors' health does not have a significant effect on coresidence 
among unmarried seniors. It seems puzzling that we are not seeing 
the expected health effects in the unmarried sample but do see them 
for the married. We would have expected unmarried people in poorer 
health to have even greater need for assistance from children, since 
they do not have a spouse who can help. We can think of several 
reasons for this unexpected result: It is possible that the assistance 
provided by coresident children leads to improvements (or slows the 
decline) in the senior's health. This effect, in the opposite direction of 
that hypothesized above and with the opposite sign, could weaken an 
effect running from health to living arrangements. Furthermore, 
whereas the senior presumably would benefit more from coresidence
when his or her health is poor, the potential benefits to children, in 
terms of the services that the senior can provide (e.g., housework, child 
care), are greater when the senior is healthy. However, we are unsure 
why these relationships should be more important for unmarried than 
for married seniors.
Our results suggest that health effects may differ for the
married and unmarried, and perhaps between males and females.
This may explain why Martin (1989), who pooled the married and?
unmarried and men and women, did not find significant effects of 
health on living arrangements in Malaysia.
Senior's and Spouse's Age
i
As noted above, no age variables (separately for husbands and 
wives in the married sample and for the respondents in the unmarried 
sample) had statistically significant effects when included in 
regressions otherwise like those in Table 2. These age effects were 
little affected by whether health was controlled, as conjectured in 
Hypothesis #5. However, as hypothesized in the last part of #8, some 
of the age effects were considerably different when the numbers and 
ages of children were net controlled. In particular, without controls for 
children’s ages, we found that husbands, wives, and unmarried seniors 
aged 70 and older were less likely to coreside compared with their 
younger counterparts than what we find when ages of children are 
controlled. As noted above, Casterline et al. (1991) report similar 
findings.
The coresidence rate for married couples in which the wife is 
very young (age <40) is lower than that for couples with older wives. 
However, there are very few wives in this age group and, in most cases, 
these women, who are all married to men at least 20 years older, are 
not the men's original wives and are not the biological mothers of the 
children under consideration. For example, most of the wives aged <40 
had been married less than 20 years (and hence could not have 
children aged 20 or older). Hence, adult children appear to be 
especially unlikely to be living with their fathers if those fathers have 
remarried (younger women). Although these results certainly are not 
conclusive, they do suggest that future studies should take into account 
whether the children under consideration are “his,” “hers,” or “theirs.”
Income
Higher unearned income (excluding transfers) significantly 
reduces the likelihood of coresidence with adult children for the 
unmarried, but does not have a significant effect for the married. The 
negative income effects that we find for the unmarried supports our 
hypothesis (#6) that seniors who can afford to purchase privacy will do 
so.
In Table 3 we present income coefficients from regressions 
otherwise like those in Table 2 but with broader measures of income to 
assess the sensitivity of estimated income effects to the definition of 
income. We see that income effects are sensitive to the definition of 
income. They are positive and very significant when we include
income of other household members (whose very existence is related to 
living arrangements). Once that component of income is removed, 
income effects switch to being negative, and are significant for the 
unmarried. Removing the earned income of the senior and spouse, 
which may be related to living arrangements because decisions about 
work may be jointly determined with decisions about living 
arrangements, does not affect the estimated income effect much, 
though for both samples the income effects become somewhat less
negative. Finally, excluding transfers from relatives living elsewhere,
£which may substitute for coresidence, has the expected effect of making 
income effects more positive, though, as noted above, a significant 
negative effect remains for the unmarried.
Education
We had expected that more education would be negatively 
associated with coresidence, because of its correlation with more 
modem attitudes and with permanent income. We do see this for 
married males: Husbands with secondary education are significantly 
less likely to coreside than those with no education (P=0.04) or with 
primary education (P =0.03). Education does not have a significant 
effect for wives or for the unmarried sample, which consists mainly of 
widowed females, though there is a suggestion that higher education 
may be positively related to coresidence. Hence, it appears that the 
effects of education may differ for men and women.
Number, Ages, and Gender of Children
The effects of additional children vary with the ages and gender
of those children and differ between the married and unmarried. The
numbers of sons aged 20-29 years and aged 30-39 are positively and
significantly associated with coresidence for both the married and the
unmarried. In both cases, but especially for the unmarried, the effect
is stronger for the 20-29 than the 30-39 age group. For the married,
?numbers of daughters aged 20-29 and 30-39 also have significant 
effects of magnitudes nearly identical to those for sons in the same age 
group. However, for the unmarried, numbers of daughters in these age 
groups do not have statistically significant effects. For neither sample 
do the number of children, of either gender, aged 40 or older 
significantly affect whether the senior coresides with an adult child. 
This set of results is consistent with the notion that some younger 
adult children may not have left home yet.
For unmarried, the greater the number of children under the 
age of 20 that the senior has, the significantly less likely a child age 20 
or older is to be still living with his or her parents. (Recall that all 
seniors in the sample have at least one child aged 20 or older.) We also 
find a negative relationship for the married, but it is not statistically 
significant. These results suggests that younger siblings may be able 
to provide some of the same benefits to parents that children aged 20 
or older do. Having such younger siblings at home may “free” young 
adults to be able to leave home earlier. This is consistent with
evidence from historical Belgium (Alter et al., forthcoming), where the
youngest child typically had responsibility for aging parents.
As noted above, previous studies in a variety of settings have
found that the total number of children of any age that the senior has
is strongly positively associated with the likelihood of parent-child
coresidence, as we do for ¿fl children aged 20 and older (in results not
presented here). However, we have shown here that the effect of the
number of children differs markedly with the ages of those children
?
and, for the unmarried, with the gender of the children. Casterline et
ral. (1991) also showed the importance of considering ages of children. 
They found the likelihood of coresidence to be greater the younger the 
age of the youngest child, wh®ch is consistent with our results.
Ethnicity
For both the married and unmarried, Malays are the least likely 
of the ethnic groups to coreside with an adult child. The generally low 
coresidence rates for Malays may reflect the fact that Malay parents 
and children may be more likely to live nearby rather than in the same 
living quarters. It may also reflect the fact that Malays have a lower 
average age at marriage and are more likely to live independently 
immediately after marriage than either Chinese or Indians (Tan and 
Jones 1990), and hence, for both reasons, children are likely to leave 
home sooner. For the married, the Chinese are most likely of the three 
ethnic groups to coreside, while, for the unmarried, the Indians are the 
most likely. The difference between Chinese and Indians is
statistically significant for the married but not for the. unmarried. 
Contrary to the expectation in the second part of Hypothesis #10, 
ethnic differentials change relatively little when the urban/rural 
variables and housing costs are not controlled.
Gender of Senior
In the unmarried sample, the gender of the senior does not 
significantly effect the probability of coresiding with an adult child. 
Martin (1989) and Casterline et al. (1991) also found no effect of gender 
on coresidence in their studies of parent-child coresidence in various 
Asian countries.
(Conclusions 
Support for the Hypotheses Implied by the Conceptual 
Framework
The conceptual framework motivating our analysis implies that 
coresidence of seniors with adult children may be affected by the 
benefits, costs, opportunities, and preferences for coresidence versus 
separate living arrangements. Our analysis generally supports the 
notion that these concepts are associated with living arrangements of 
older people in Peninsular Malaysia.
B enefits o f Coresidence. Regarding benefits, we had 
hypothesized that seniors should be more likely to coreside with their 
adult children the greater their needs for assistance -- emotional, 
financial, or physical. We found that married (but not unmarried)
seniors are more likely to coreside the greater the housing costs in 
their area. This suggests that married parents and their children live 
together to economize on living costs. The greater housing costs in " -7 
urban areas explain a small part of the greater levels of coresidence in 
urban areas seen when other variables (particularly housing costs) are 
not controlled.
We also expected that seniors in poorer health would benefit
more from coresidence. We generally find this to be true for married
■ ".seniors. Couples in which the husband is in poor health or in which
the wife is in fair health are more likely to coreside than their
healthier counterparts. Health, however, has no significant effect on
coresidence among unmarried seniors. We had also expected that
unmarried seniors would have a greater need to coreside because they
lack the companionship and support of a spouse, but we did not see
significant differences between married and unmarried seniors in our
data, regardless of whether other variables were controlled.
Costs o f Coresidence. We hypothesized that an important “cost” 
of coresidence is reduced privacy and that, as incomes increase, people 
may choose to purchase privacy. We find that the measure of income 
considered here — unearned income of the senior (and spouse), \
excluding transfer income -- is negatively associated with coresidence 
for the unmarried. For the married, husband's secondary education, ^
iwhich may reflect his permanent income, is negatively associated withj 
coresidence. Although it is sometimes presumed that notions of '
individualism are not as prevalent in Asia as in the West, our results
suggest that many older people in Malaysia dû value privacy and 
independence. ,
O p p o rtun ities fo r  Coresidence. The hypothesis that senior
coresidence may be affected by opportunities to coreside is strongly
supported in this analysis. Number of children, ages of children, and
gender of children all generally affect seniors' living arrangements in
the directions hypothesized; the effect of numbers of children varies
with the age and gender of those children.
?
Preferences R e g a rd in g  Córesidence. However, not all variations 
in coresidence are explained byHhe factors just discussed. Even when 
these factors are controlled, there remain significant differences among 
ethnic and urban/rural groups and by husband's education, suggesting 
that attitudes about parent-child coresidence may differ among these 
groups.
Policy Implications
Thus we find that coresidence decisions are generally affected in 
expected ways by economic factors such as the ability to afford 
separate housing and the costs of housing in the area. Hence, policies 
such as those recently implemented in Malaysia, that increase the 
financial incentives for older people and their adult children to 
coreside, are likely to increase the likelihood of such coresidence.
However, the data also suggest that coresidence between 
parents and their adult children is already the norm for most 
Malaysians. For example, we find that married older Malaysians are
nearly as likely to live with their adult children as their unmarried 
counterparts; of married Malaysians aged 60+ who have adult children 
(aged 20+), only one in three do ngi coreside with an adult child. Such 
high rates of parent-child coresidence may explain why old-age homes 
in Malaysia are not widely used (Personal communication with George 
Chan).
Implications About Coresidence in the Future
These results also have implications about how the likelihood of 
coresidence may change in the future with socio-economic development 
and demographic change. Increases in housing costs may lead to 
increased coresidence, with coresidence serving as a beneficial, cost-
Isaving response. Higher incomes and education, however, may lead to 
reduced coresidence as seniors may begin to prefer privacy and are 
better able to afford it. Reductions in fertility will reduce the number 
of children with whom seniors can coreside, and may, in so doing, 
reduce their likelihood of living with an adult child, though this only 
seems to matter when children are in their twenties or thirties. 
Furthermore, a reduction in the number of younger siblings may cause 
earlier birth-order children to leave home later. If decreases in 
mortality are accompanied by increases in healthy life, this could lead 
to reduced coresidence. It is also possible, with the increased 
availability of spouses (due to lower mortality rates), there may be a 
reduction in coresidence with children because spouses can provide 
companionship and assistance, though the differences between the
33
married and unmarried are not statistically significant in the 
(relatively small) samples considered here. It is difficult to predict, a 
priori, how these negative and positive influences will balance out and 
what their net effect will be.
Implications For Future Research and Future Data Collection
The analyses presented here suggest that influences on parent- 
child coresidence may differ between the married and unmarried and 
that spouse characteristics are Important for the former. Hence, future 
data collection efforts should not only seek detailed information about 
the selected respondent, but should also try to collect considerable
information about the spouses of married respondents (e.g., their age,
i
education, income, health, and their children from previous marriages). 
The data analyzed here suggest that it is probably not necessary to 
also interview the spouses; it appears that senior respondents can 
provide useful (proxy) information about the characteristics of their 
spouses.
We have also seen that numbers, ages, and gender of the senior's 
children influence coresidence decisions. Unfortunately the data used 
here did not document other characteristics of non-coresident children, 
such as their marital status, employment status, income, or number of 
children (the senior’s grandchildren), that may also affect coresidence 
between older people and their adult children (e.g., by affecting the 
adult children's need for child care by the senior). It is important to 
collect such information about all of the children with whom the
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respondent could potentially live, including those with whom they do
not currently live. Furthermore, it is important to try tp collect data on
the exact ages of non-coresident children, so that the risk set of
children with whom the senior could potentially live can be
alternatively defined (e.g., to be children aged 25 or older) and so that
the youngest and oldest child in the family can be uniquely identified.
(Such data were not collected for the MFLS-2 Senior sample because
the Senior respondents had great difficulty reporting the exact ages of?
their non-coresident children.)
This study has also illustrated the usefulness of having data on 
incomes and area housing costs. We have shown, however, that 
estimates of the effects of income on coresidence are very sensitive to 
the definition of income and that these estimates can be biased if the 
income measure includes components, such as the income of other 
household members or transfers received from non-coresident children, 
that may be directly affected by living arrangements. Similarly, the 
measure of housing costs should not reflect the living arrangement 
chosen (e.g., extended households may pay more because they live in 
larger houses), but should measure how the cost of a specified type of 
housing varies across localities.
Notes
1 If the Senior respondent is married, the couple is included in the 
sample if either the respondent or his/her spouse (or both) is age 60 or 
older. Hence, the sample used here is equivalent to the one we would
have chosen had our sampling rule been to select a household if it 
contained at least one person aged 60 or older.
Twenty-one seniors aged 60+ were excluded because they did not 
have any children or because their children were all under age 20. An 
additional 12 respondents were dropped because we did not know the 
ages of their children living elsewhere. Three additional observations 
were dropped because the senior’s marital status code was missing.
2 Respondents to the Community Questionnaire were asked to 
estimate the cost of two types of housing in their area: (1) the cost of a 
10-year-old, two-story link house ,with three bedrooms in an average
Ineighborhood of the town, village, or estate in which the respondent 
was being interviewed, and (2) the cost of a 10-year-old kampung 
house, with a half-acre of land around it, in the village in which the 
respondent was being interviewed. For rural areas we use the cost of a 
kampung house, which is the dominant type of housing in rural areas. 
In urban areas we use the cost of a link house, which is the main type 
of housing in urban areas.
Where housing costs were missing for a particular sub-EB, we 
substituted the average housing cost for that EB (using data from 
other sub-EBs in that EB). If the housing cost for an entire EB was 
missing, we substituted the average cost of housing in other EBs of the 
same type (metropolitan, large urban, small urban, or rural) in the
same district. A missing-value dummy is entered into the regression 
for the few remaining cases without a value for housing cost.
We use the housing costs of the area in which the senior lives. 
There is a question of whether the relevant locality is where the senior 
lives, where each of their non-coresident children live, or some other 
place. For an analysis of parent-child location, see Wolf, Clark, and 
Schulte (1993). ?
3 Some observations have missing values for housing costs, income, 
age, or education. Dummy variables for missing values were included
in the regression for these cases, but these coefficients are not reported
¿in Table 2.
4 The housing-cost coefficient for the married had much stronger 
statistical significance (t=3.06) when we considered the larger sample 
of all seniors aged 50+ or older.
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Table 1: Means of Variables Used in the Analysis
Married sample Unmarried sample
Live with an adult child 0.693 0.725
Housing Costs: (in ringgit) 59,060 ' 66,008
Location (D): Large Urban 0.374 0.400
Small Urban 0.067 0.076
Rural 0.559 0.534











Poor C 0.074 -
Income (in ringgit): Senior's (and spouse’s)
unearned income 291 254
Education CD'): Senior's education











Number of children, bv Under 20









Ethnicity (D): Malay 0.502 0.416
Chinese 0.396 0.455
Indian 0.102 0.129
Gender of Senior (D): Male _ 0.212
Female - 0.788
NOTE: Means are weighted to reflect over-representation of Indians in MFLS-2 sample and under­
representation of seniors living in households with more than one senior.
D=Dichotomous indicator.





Unearned Income (Log): 
Education:
Number of Children by 
Age and Gender:
Ethnicity:




























































































+ = P< .20, # = P< . 1 0 , *  = P <  .05, ** = P < .01, *** = P < .001 (two-tailed tests)
Table 3: Sensitivity of Estimated Income 
Effects to the Definition of Income - 
[Table entries are coefficients (and t--statistics) front logistic 
' regressions otherwise like those in Table 2]
Income Measure Married Sample U nm arried  Sample
Total household income
Total income of senior and spouse
Total unearned income of senior 
and spouse
Total unearned income of senior 










* = P < .05, *** = P < .001 (two-tailed tests)
